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 ABSTRACT 
Drawing together research in the upper echelon perspective, strategy, and organizational 
sociology, this paper examines (1) the relationship between the finance expertise of a venture 
capital (VC) firm’s management team and investment selection, and (2) the moderation of 
this relationship by the VC firm’s social position. We find that while finance expertise is 
associated with a lower proportion of early-stage investments, this relationship is weaker for 
firms with high reputation and stronger for firms with high status. We conclude with a 
discussion of the importance and nuances of external image considerations on investment 
decisions as well as insights into the importance of the requisite nature of expertise.  
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1. Executive summary 
There has been significant scholarly interest in understanding the investment selection 
decisions of venture capital (VC) firms, e.g., the selection criteria or cognitive processes 
involved in making these decisions. Researchers have made a substantial contribution to the 
literature by identifying common elements to the decision making processes across VC firms. 
With this paper, we seek to understand why these processes lead to different selection results, 
i.e., why equally aspiring VC firms make early-stage investments to varying degrees. 
Acknowledging the importance of top management team (TMT) composition for decision 
making and the inclusion of VC firms in investment and fundraising networks, we 
concomitantly consider the effects of finance expertise of the VC firm’s management team 
and the firm’s reputation and status on investment selection.  
We find that VC firms with higher finance expertise select fewer early-stage 
investments. In addition, despite the apparent similarity of the constructs of reputation and 
status as representations of how a firm is perceived by its external constituents, this study 
allows us to disentangle their distinct facets. We find that both reputation and status moderate 
the finance expertise-investment decision relationship but in opposing ways. Status magnifies 
this relationship: for higher-status VC firms, higher finance expertise induces an even 
stronger avoidance of early-stage investments. Interestingly, reputation appears to have the 
opposite, alleviating effect: the negative relationship between finance expertise and early 
stage investments is stronger for less reputable firms than for more reputable firms.  We 
account for this surprising finding in our discussion by developing a number of possible 
explanations around management discretion, affordability of experimentation, and the role of 
reputation in increasing the odds of success. 
Our study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by explaining why some VC 
firms make more early-stage investments than others and by enhancing the theoretical arsenal 
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for studying VC decision making. We also contribute to the broader organizational literature 
in two important ways. First, our results suggest that researchers need to pay closer attention 
to the type rather than simply the amount of management team expertise. Second, although 
external image considerations play important roles in management decision making, we tease 
out important but heretofore ignored nuances in the concepts of reputation and status.  
There are a number of practical implications that emerge from our study. From the 
VC firm perspective, the results provide insight into how their management team expertise 
and social standing affect their deal flow and ultimate investment selection. From the 
perspective of the recipient of venture capital, our results suggest that entrepreneurs looking 
for early-stage financing for their ventures would be well served by an in-depth examination 
of the management expertise of their potential VC firms. Given the strong network 
repercussions of a “no decision”, it pays to be exposed to the “right” VC firm early on.    
2. Introduction 
There has been substantial scholarly interest in understanding the investment selection 
decisions of venture capital (VC) firms. In particular, researchers have sought to explore the 
decision-making process in terms of the selection criteria applied (MacMillan, Siegel, and 
Subbanarasimha 1985; Muzyka, Birley, and Leleux 1996; Shepherd, Ettenson, and Crouch 
2000; Tyebjee and Bruno 1984; Wright, Robbie, and Ennew 1997) or the cognitive processes 
employed (Hisrich and Jankowicz 1990; Rosman and O’Neill 1993; Zacharakis and Shepherd 
2001). What is common to all these studies is that researchers have focused on the 
commonalities across VC firms, thereby identifying a proto-typical decision making process.  
As a result, the differences in investment decisions, reflecting individual or organizational 
differences in evaluating the opportunities or risks associated with prospective ventures, have 
received relatively little attention. 
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It is now well established in organizational research that a firm’s strategic choices are 
driven by its top management team (TMT), and that differences in such choices can be 
explained by TMT demographics (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Recent application of this 
view to the context of VC firm performance has shown that the nature of the VC partners’ 
expertise indeed affects both the successes and failures in the firm’s portfolio (Dimov and 
Shepherd, 2005).  Yet, in addition to such firm-specific effects, there are also external 
influences. Specifically, in order to mitigate the uncertainty they face in selecting potential 
investments, VC firms are continuously involved in investment syndicates (Bygrave, 1987; 
Lerner, 1994) and are thus part of a broader social network. Their standing in this network 
appears to influence their investment decisions (Podolny, 2001; Sorensen and Stuart, 2001).  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the degree to which VC firms’ investment 
decisions are affected by the (requisite) nature of their TMT expertise and their social 
network standing.  To capture the latter, we use two constructs – reputation and status – used 
in the fields of strategy and economic sociology to represent an organization’s social 
standing. Despite the apparent similarity of these two constructs, as evidenced by the 
significant overlap in their use (e.g. Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Podolny, 2001; Shane and 
Cable, 2002; Stuart, 1998; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999), this study follows recent work 
that disentangles their distinct facets (Washington and Zajac, 2005). Specifically, we study 
the investment allocation decisions of 108 US venture capital firms over a 6-year period. We 
highlight the importance of relevant (i.e. requisite) expertise and also show that reputation 
and status moderate the expertise-decision relationship in opposing ways.  
Our study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by enhancing its theoretical 
arsenal for the study of VC decision making and by explaining why, among equally aspiring 
VC firms, some make more early-stage investments than others. In line with recent 
arguments presented by Vogus and Sutcliffe (2003), our results suggest that researchers need 
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to pay closer attention to the type rather than simply the amount of management team 
expertise. Our findings contribute to the upper echelon perspective by highlighting the role of 
external image considerations in TMT decision making. And we also contribute to the 
strategy and economic sociology literatures by teasing out important, heretofore ignored 
nuances in the constructs of reputation and status, representing a firm’s external image.  
The article proceeds as follows. First, we provide an overview of the concept of 
requisite expertise and discuss its specific form in the context of venture capital firms and 
their portfolio investments. We then discuss the concepts of reputation and status and provide 
specific arguments for their moderating effects on the relationship between TMT requisite 
expertise and investment selection. In the remaining sections, we describe our methodology 
and results, and then discuss our findings.   
3. Theory and hypotheses 
Venture capital firms raise funds from various investors and then seek to invest these 
funds in private companies with the purpose of achieving superior investment returns. While 
some VC firms invest in companies that are in the process of exploring ideas for which there 
are not yet developed commercial products or tested markets (i.e. early-stage companies), 
others prefer late-stage companies, i.e. those with well-defined market and product 
characteristics, seeking to expand or improve their established business.  The less developed 
a prospective company, the higher the uncertainty that a VC firm faces in making its 
investment decision (Podolny, 2001).  
3.1. Management team expertise and investment choice 
The contemplation of any investment essentially entails weighing the opportunities 
and threats that it poses to a particular investor. A considerable body of research in 
organizations suggests that although top managers within firms perceive environmental 
threats and opportunities similarly, they perceive them differently from top managers in other 
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organizations, even within the same industry (Milliken, 1990; Sutcliffe and Huber, 1998). 
And while a number of factors may account for these inter-organizational differences (Boyd, 
Dess, and Rasheed, 1993; Sutcliffe, 1994), the diversity of team members’ past work 
experiences often affects the team’s perspectives and opinions (e.g., Sutcliffe, 1994), actions 
(McDonald and Westphal, 2003), as well as organizational outcomes (Bunderson and 
Sutcliffe, 2002). With differences in the composition of organizations’ top management 
teams (TMTs), there are different strategic actions towards uncertain markets (Flood, Fong, 
Smith, O’Regan, Moore, and Morley, 1997) 
The relationship between TMT’s functional diversity and performance, although 
widely studied, has shown mixed results (see Bunderson and Sutcliffe [2002] for a review). 
Functional background is a proxy for the information, knowledge, skills, and expertise that 
individuals bring to a group (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). Researchers have generally 
focused on the breadth or amount of variety within a team, i.e., whether the different 
dominant functional perspectives across team members cover a broad range of functional 
categories or are restricted to a subset of categories, thereby overlooking the “relevance” of 
the variety. Although studies have assumed that any variety will do, a growing body of work 
suggests that variety alone is insufficient to benefit an organization. Rather, as Vogus and 
Sutcliffe (2003) argue (and empirically show), it is the content of variety that matters (Cohen, 
1986) and the extent to which a team’s variety matches the characteristics of the firm’s 
environment(s). In other words, performance depends on the appropriateness of the team’s 
specific knowledge for the organization’s environment(s) or strategy. Relevant expertise 
affects the team’s understanding of the uncertainty that exists and is likely to influence the 
team’s decisions to enter particular market segments (Van de Ven, 1986). 
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Although the tasks of the VC firm can be classified in terms of pre- and post-
investment activities
1
, in this study we are concerned with the former rather than the latter.  
Pre-investment activities involve those tasks up to, and including, the signing of an 
investment contract, e.g., soliciting new venture proposals for submission to the VC firm, 
determining whether these proposals meet the firm’s broad screening criteria, conducting due 
diligence (more extensive research to determine the likely success of the venture), and then 
negotiating and structuring a relationship with the entrepreneur. While some of the 
investment proposals pertain to companies that are in the process of exploring ideas for which 
there are not yet fully developed commercial products or tested markets (i.e. early stage), 
others involve companies with well established products and markets, seeking to expand or 
optimize their business (i.e. late stage). Decisions to invest in early- versus late-stage ventures 
are likely to hinge on the extent to which decision makers perceive the venture to be risky, as 
well as the extent to which they expect that there will be a proper risk-return balance. 
Assessments of these factors will be shaped by the distinct expertise held by a firm’s TMT. 
On one hand, while early-stage ventures have higher perceived risk, relevant industry 
(operations, marketing, general management) or prior entrepreneurial experience reduce this 
risk (March and Shapira, 1987). This is driven at least in part by the expectation of adding 
value to the particular venture. On the other hand, an investment decision needs to be an 
efficient allocation of capital and thus requires a proper risk-return balance. The estimation of 
the latter is facilitated by finance experience and is more robust in the context of more 
established ventures. Therefore, a VC firm’s experience may help explain the investment 
allocation diversity among VC firms.   
We focus explicitly on the TMT’s expertise in finance, what we call finance capacity, 
and explore its implications for the investment allocation decisions by VC capital firms. 
                                                 
1
 Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) proposed a model of the venture capital process with five stages: deal origination, 
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Accordingly, we implicitly treat other industry experience as a boundary condition for our 
theoretical development.
2
 As indicated above, finance capacity is important as it ensures that 
financial resources are put to their most efficient use based on the criteria established by 
capital markets. Research has shown that when capital market considerations permeate an 
organization’s performance environment, the number of executives with finance backgrounds 
increases (Fligstein, 1987; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). In this regard, one of the main 
responsibilities of VC firms towards their fund investors is ensuring adequate returns given 
the risk profile of their portfolio and the opportunity cost for the fund investors (i.e. 
alternative investment vehicles such as stocks, bonds or real estate trusts).  
The finance capacity of a VC firm specifically refers to its top management team’s 
expertise in evaluating the return potential as well as in managing the financial resources of a 
prospective venture. The value of a team’s finance capacity comes from TMT members’ 
abilities to assess the future pay-offs of potential investments and the risks associated with 
those pay-offs. Teams with greater finance capacity will also be more likely to recognize 
those contexts in which assessments of pay-off and risk are not possible (or are too costly). 
Because it provides the team with greater understanding of the investment potential, finance 
capacity improves the managers’ comprehension of the requirements for making the potential 
investment successful. Furthermore, portfolio companies often look to the VC firm to provide 
finance and accounting information (Mitchell, Reid, and Terry, 1995).     
Later-stage ventures have well-defined product-market characteristics, which allows 
for a better estimation of the potential portfolio company’s future pay-offs and the level of 
unsystematic risk.  As a consequence, later-stage investments represent a context in which 
risk (including agency risk) can be better managed (Amit, Brander, and Zott, 1998; Carter 
and van Auken, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). Finance capacity is a source of knowledge on how 
                                                                                                                                                        
deal screening, deal evaluation, deal structuring and post-investment.   
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to best manage the risk of a particular investment, such as determining the most appropriate 
financial structure (e.g., a mix of voting and preference shares), as well as on how to improve 
portfolio firm performance, such as through introducing more “sophisticated” financial and 
information systems.  Accordingly, if faced with two potential ventures with similar 
characteristics but at different stages of development, a VC firm with high finance capacity 
would prefer the later- to the earlier-stage venture.  
Hypothesis 1. There is a negative relationship between a VC firm’s finance 
capacity and its decision to invest in early-stage ventures.  
 
3.2 Organization's perceived quality, TMT expertise, and investment choice  
Entangled in a network of syndication partners and institutional investors who have 
limited information to appropriately judge the quality of a VC firm, VC firms strive to project 
and maintain signals of their quality (Gompers, 1996). The concept of perceived quality has 
been well developed in strategy and economic sociology. In strategy research, firm quality is 
captured by the construct of reputation – a “perceptual representation of a company's past 
actions and future prospects that describe the firm's overall appeal to all its key constituents 
when compared to other leading rivals" (Fombrun, 1996: 72). In economic sociology, firm 
quality is captured by the construct of status. It pertains to the external perception of the 
organization, based on the structural position that it occupies in its wider network of inter-
organizational relationships (Podolny, 1993) and is essentially an “unearned ascription of 
social rank” (Washington and Zajac, 2005 p. 282).  
A firm’s reputation is established on the basis of its past performance, whereas its 
status is the consequence of its pattern of social relationships and the quality of its network 
partners. Despite the high degree of closeness between these two constructs, as evidenced by 
                                                                                                                                                        
2
 Other experiences are also important.  For example, VC firm managers with considerable experience in a 
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the significant overlap in their usage (e.g. Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Podolny, 2001; Shane 
and Cable, 2002; Stuart, 1998; Stuart et al., 1999), there might be distinct, heretofore 
unexplored facets to them. Indeed, as Washington and Zajac argue, “status is fundamentally a 
sociological concept that captures differences in social rank that generate privilege or 
discrimination (not performance-based rewards), while reputation is fundamentally an 
economic concept that captures differences in perceived or actual quality or merit that 
generate earned, performance-based rewards” (2005 p. 283). Hence, in this section, we will 
focus on the particular effects that these two different “channels” to perceived quality may 
exert on the relationship between TMT finance expertise and investment allocation decisions.   
3.2.1 Reputation and perceived quality  
Reputation serves as a signal of future performance based on perceptions of past 
performance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Podolny, 1994; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; 
Shane and Cable, 2002). For example, in their discussion of technological and commercial 
prominence, Stuart et al. (1999) found that those firms that had successfully exploited 
technological innovations or had been successful in evaluating biotechnology companies had 
built up reputations that underlay expectations by external parties that these firms would 
continue to be successful in the future. In the context of the VC industry, reputation is 
associated with the success of a VC firm’s previous investments, which in turn affects the VC 
firm’s ability to raise and invest new funds.  For instance, the amount of money available to 
be invested in future portfolio companies is dependent, in part, upon VC firms’ past 
performances in terms of returns on investment and association with initial public offerings 
(IPOs) (Gompers, 1996).  In addition, VC firms that have made successful investments in the 
past are more desirable syndication partners (Lerner, 1994) and thus have access to more 
                                                                                                                                                        
particular industry are more likely to invest in and able to add value to portfolio companies in that industry. 
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deals. Visibility is also an important aspect of reputation (Lang and Lang, 1988) as it 
contributes to increasing the inflow of investments into funds (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). 
In the finance literature, there is a long tradition of examining the effects of reputation 
on investment behavior in financial markets. Reputation is often positively linked to the past 
performance of an actor. That is, external agents learn about the quality of the focal actor 
through observing its past performance over time (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982). In the 
context of fund management, there is a positive relationship between the inflow of new 
investment into a fund and the fund’s past performance (Ippolito, 1992; Sirri and Tufano, 
1998). Because fund management companies typically receive a fixed percentage of assets 
under management as compensation, there is a strong incentive for them to increase the total 
assets of the portfolio (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). But increasing the total assets of the 
portfolio creates an additional incentive to alter its overall risk profile (Chevalier and Ellison, 
1997). Specifically, those firms with superior past performance are more likely to develop a 
reputation for quality and this reputation represents a valuable asset, one worth protecting 
(Diamond, 1989).  Reputation is protected by reducing the overall riskiness of the portfolio 
by making future investments in “safer” projects (Diamond, 1989). 
The above argument suggests that VC firms with high reputation may prefer “safer,” 
i.e. later-stage projects. In other words, protecting a VC firm’s reputation may move a firm 
away from early-stage projects. However, some VC firms may have made their reputation 
with investments in early-stage companies and thus be less willing to adjust their investment 
strategy away from such companies. As we argued earlier, the investment allocation into 
early- vs. late-stage projects depends on the VC firm managers’ possessing expertise that is 
requisite for the particular type of project. Where such expertise is lacking, there is lower 
perceived control over the project’s outcomes and thus greater perceived risk for the project 
overall (March and Shapira, 1987).  This is especially relevant to the VC context given the 
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direct involvement of VCs in the management of their portfolio companies (Lerner, 1994, 
1995; Sandberg, 1986; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984) and thus in their ultimate success or failure 
(Dimov and Shepherd, 2005). This suggests that expertise-allocation combinations that give 
rise to high perceived risk (i.e. when there is requisite mismatch) are likely to be perceived as 
less attractive investments, especially by those with high reputation who perceive that they 
have more to lose. Hypothesis 1 suggests that the requisite environment for a team of high 
finance capacity is that of later-stage investments. Therefore, for TMTs with high finance 
capacity, investing in early-stage companies is likely to be perceived as a riskier choice. This 
increased risk would constitute a particularly high concern for the more reputable VC firms 
as they strive to preserve their established reputations.  Thus: 
Hypothesis 2. VC firm reputation strengthens  the negative relationship 
between finance capacity and the decision to invest in early-stage ventures. 
 
3.2.2 Status and perceived quality  
The sociological view of markets focuses on the social construction of the positions 
that the various organizations occupy (White, 1981). When there is uncertainty over the 
quality of organizations involved in a particular market as well as prohibitive costs of 
carrying out evaluative search, an organization’s status provides a signal of quality (Podolny, 
1993). The status-based nature of market competition creates an uneven distribution of 
rewards and cost burdens within markets, such that high status organizations have lower 
transaction costs in acquiring resources (Podolny, 1993) and are the preferred partners of 
other high-status organizations (Podolny, 1994), both of which are positively associated with 
performance (Stuart et al., 1999).  
As Podolny (2001) argues, however, high status is not universally valuable; it is of 
little value when there is high uncertainty about the decisions an organization should make to 
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achieve market success.  Put differently, without knowing what market opportunities to 
pursue, it is difficult for a firm to leverage its high status due to the possibility that it might 
line up resources towards the “wrong” opportunity. To the extent that the “wrong” allocation 
of resources creates a negative association for the firm, it will have an undermining effect on 
it status (Washington and Zajac, 2005). High-status firms thus tend to avoid projects of high 
uncertainty.  The corollary of this logic for the context of venture capital investment 
decisions is that as the status of a VC firm increases, the firm tends to move away from 
investments in early-stage companies, i.e., those projects for which there is greater 
uncertainty about what it takes to achieve market success (Podolny, 2001).  
Yet, as we have argued so far, project uncertainty is not absolute but rather firm 
specific, dependent upon the requisite nature of the VC firm’s management expertise. For a 
VC team with particular finance capacity, some projects will elicit higher uncertainty than 
others and thus put more strain on the VC firm’s status. A VC firm would utilize better the 
transaction cost benefits derived from its status for its less uncertain projects – it could access 
high quality exchange partners to sell-off some inventory, factor accounts receivable, or 
renegotiate lease agreements.  Lining up similar support for projects it considers more 
uncertain creates the anxiety of compromising its status. This implies that, while VC firms 
with high finance capacity avoid early-stage investments, those with high status among them 
would have an even stronger incentive to do so.  
Hypothesis 3. VC firm status strengthens  the negative relationship between 
finance capacity and the decision to invest in early-stage ventures.  
4. Method 
4.1. Sample 
We designed the study with four factors in mind. First, we required VC firms that 
faced decisions to invest in the “same” industry (Wireless Communication), but an industry 
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that provided considerable choice of portfolio companies at different stages of development. 
Second, we required VC firms that have made a sufficient number of investments, so that 
enough data would be available to infer the top managers’ various investment choices. Third, 
since background data were to be collected on current team members, we had to limit the 
time period examined so that it would be reasonable to attribute the investment decisions 
made over the selected period to the identified team members. Finally, we limited our 
analysis to independent VC firms since subsidiaries of financial or other corporations are 
likely to have goals and/or strategies imposed on its team by the parent company. Thus, we 
used Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert database to create a sampling frame of all 
independent VC firms in the US that have invested in at least 20 portfolio companies over the 
1997-2002 period, with at least one investment in the Wireless Communication industry.  
From this list of 252 VC firms, we collected information on a random selection of 108 firms.  
Because the 1997-2002 period was quite distinct in the development of the US VC 
industry, with a rapid increase of investment activity between 1997 and 2000 and a rapid 
decline thereafter, we needed to ensure that it would not affect the generalization of our 
results. Figure 1 shows the proportion of first-time early-stage investments by US VC firms 
over the period 1980-2002 as well as the proportion of early-stage investments by our sample 
firms over the 1997-2002 period. The figure shows that the proportion of first-time early-
stage investments diminishes over time, especially in the latter part of the 1990s. This may be 
indeed due to the gradual increase in funds under management, leading to higher deal sizes, 
as well as to the large number of new entrants in the VC industry in the 1990s. Nevertheless, 
for our particular sample VC firms, given that they tend to be bigger and thus more 
experienced, the level of early-stage investing in the 1997-2002 period is more consistent 
with the earlier industry development and also follows the overall industry pattern
3
.  
                                                 
3
 A separate analysis for the 1997-1999 sub-period revealed no change in the reported results. 
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------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here  
------------------------------------------------------ 
4.2. Measures 
4.2.1 Dependent variable  
As is commonly done in the VC community, the VentureXpert database classified 
investments into stages, representing an increasing degree of development. We used six main 
categories to represent a portfolio company’s development stage: (1) seed, (2) start-up, (3) 
other early stage, (4) expansion, (5) later/acquisition, and (6) other late stage. We measured 
the extent to which the VC firm managers chose to invest in early-stage ventures as the 
proportion of first-time investments made by the VC firm in companies at the seed, start-up 
or other early stage. We focused on the first-time investments (i.e. when a VC firm invests in 
a particular company for the first time) in order to exclude from consideration the repeated 
investments by a VC firm in the same company (i.e. follow-on investments).   
4.2.2 Independent variables  
We operationalized finance capacity as the extent to which team members have 
worked in finance industries – commercial, investment, and merchant banking as well as 
investment fund management, in both public and private markets. These industries are 
especially relevant for the VC context since they represent a major career path for entry into 
the VC industry. Because decisions in such industries are often based on sophisticated 
modelling of various market processes and their associated risks, there is much reliance on 
historical information in estimating various prediction parameters. For example, one of the 
most popular parameters reflects the volatility of a particular asset (its beta) and is typically 
derived by regressing the daily returns of the asset on the overall market’s daily returns.  This 
provides validity for our notion of finance capacity as associated with preferences for more 
precise estimation of risks and returns.   
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Data on the experiences of the team were collected from the VC firm’s website. Our 
operational definition of team was all people holding the title “general partner” or, in the 
absence of such a title, the highest ranking title in the firm hierarchy, such as, “partners”, 
“managing directors”, “directors”, and “principals”. The total number of team members on 
whom data were collected was 731, which represents an average of 6.8 members per team. 
We coded each team member for whether he or she had worked in the finance industries 
listed above, and then calculated a score representing the proportion of team members that 
have worked in these industries. For example, a score of 0.35 indicates that 35% of the team 
members have worked in finance related industries
4
. 
While the above measure does not fully capture the qualitative differences in finance 
capacity due to individual team members’ different lengths of experience in finance-related 
industries, there are several considerations related to the particular ways in which we have 
executed our study that attenuate this concern. First, our conception of finance capacity 
pertains to how “dominating” the finance experience is for the top management team as a 
whole. In this regard, when examined at the group level, i.e. across all general partners, the 
effect of the experience of individual people oscillates less. This is reinforced by the fact that 
our sample firms tend to be older and larger, and thus have on average more experienced 
partners. Second, as the descriptive statistics below suggest, finance experience tends not to 
be mixed with other experience. Therefore, by including more experienced partners, our 
sample is less susceptible to wide variation in the number of years of finance experience. Our 
approach here is consistent with recent work that uses a team-level representation of the 
backgrounds of the individual TMT members (Higgins and Gulati, 2006).   
                                                 
4
 Data on years of experience were not available and therefore it was not possible to calculate a “dominant” 
experience for each member.  However, we did calculate an alternative, more conservative measure of finance 
capacity where dominant expertise in finance was attributed only to those team members who had no experience 
outside finance-related industries or functions. There was no substantive change in the results when this 
alternate measure for finance capacity was used in the analysis (detailed below). 
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In measuring reputation as a reflection of past performance, we captured both 
evidence of past investment activity and media visibility. We captured such activity by the 
following three items: the total amount of invested capital by the VC firm, the total number 
of companies in its portfolio, and its age. This is consistent with other measurements of VC 
reputation (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Gompers, 1996). We measured media visibility by the 
number of times the firm had been mentioned in The Wall Street Journal over the period of 
the study (1997-2002)
5
. Thus, our overall measure of reputation was a composite variable 
consisting of the three items for past investment activity and the item for visibility. The 
reliability of this measure was within the accepted limits (alpha = .72).  
We measured a VC firm’s status using Bonacich’s (1987) power centrality measure, 
which is consistent with recent research on the network positions of VC firms (Podolny, 
2001; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Based on this measure, the status of a firm is dependent on 
the number and status of other firms with which it has participated in financing particular 
portfolio companies. In order to produce an unbiased measure of status, we examined the 
pattern of co-investment not among the firms in our sample, but within the group of all active 
VC firms over the period of the study. We considered a firm an active investor if it conducted 
at least five deals per year (Podolny, 2001). Therefore, we calculated the status measure using 
the 563 VC firms that had invested in at least 30 portfolio companies during the 1997-2002 
period, to capture all active investors. The measure, ci(α,β) takes the form: ci(α,β) = Σj 
(α+βcj)Rij, where Rij is an element of a relational matrix R, representing the number of 
companies in which firms i and j have invested together over the period of the study. The 
parameter α is for arbitrary scaling of the measure, while β represents the degree to which the 
centrality of firm i is a function of the centralities of other firms in the network. Following 
recommendations for setting β at less than the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of R 
                                                 
5
 As the vast majority of mentions were positive, we did not distinguish between positive and negative visibility. 
 18 
(Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002), we set β equal to three quarters of the largest 
eigenvalue (see Podolny, 1993; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). We calculated Bonacich’s power 
centrality scores for each VC firm and normalized the scores so that the highest score was 
equal to 1 and the lowest to 0. The higher a firm’s score the higher its status. 
4.2.3 Control variables  
In choosing control variables, we sought to eliminate various alternative explanations 
based on findings in the economic sociology, upper echelon, and entrepreneurship literatures. 
First, consistent with Podolny (2001), we controlled for the informational benefits that an 
organization’s social network might bestow. In particular, the more structural holes there are 
in an organization’s network the broader the range of market opportunities to which an 
organization has access (Burt, 1992). We measured structural holes using the method 
proposed by Burt (1992), which captures the proportion of an organization’s network activity 
that involves ties that are not redundant.  The higher a score on this measure the more 
structural holes in the VC firm’s network. 
Second, consistent with the literature on top management team demography, we 
controlled for several team factors including a team’s functional diversity, diversity of prior 
industry experience, team size, founder tenure, and entrepreneurial experience. The diversity 
of an organization’s TMT has been identified as having a major influence on important 
organizational decisions (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). In 
particular, the functional diversity of TMT members has been shown to capture important 
decision making effects stemming from the team’s composition (Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 
1996). In measuring TMT diversity we kept to established conventions in the literature while 
making allowances for the unique context of the VC industry.  A large number of 
professionals entering the VC industry come from the finance industries described above. 
These industries are unique in that they do not have the traditional functional separations of 
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other industries (e.g. operations, R&D, human resources, sales and marketing, etc.). As a 
consequence, we used a coarser set of functional areas for categorizing each TMT members’ 
prior functional experience: sales and marketing, accounting and finance, and operations. 
These categories broadly reflect the distinctions made by Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
between output, throughput, and peripheral functions. We coded each TMT member on 
whether he or she had had experience in any of these functional areas, and then calculated the 
proportion of TMT members that had had experience in each functional category. We then 
measured functional diversity using Blau’s (1977) method, 1-Σpi
2
, where pi is the proportion 
of TMT members with experience in a particular functional area. Because our coding allowed 
for more than one experience per team member, we rescaled the pi scores used in the formula 
above so that they would add up to one. 
The VC industry is also unique in that TMT members come from a variety of 
industries. Therefore, we complemented our measure of functional diversity with a measure 
of the diversity of prior industry experience among TMT members. We used the same 
procedure described above for functional diversity, with the following industry categories: 
finance industries, non-finance industries, consulting, law, and entrepreneurship (having 
founded a company). In order to account for the possible effects of TMT size on our diversity 
measures, we also controlled for team size, measured as the number of general partners. 
The organizational tenure of TMT members can promote or deter an organization in 
conducting innovation – longer-tenured teams make strategic choices that adhere to 
established decision-making routines that impede innovation (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Controlling for the average tenure of TMT members 
accounts for the degree to which decision-making within the TMT is routinized. Because we 
lacked detailed information on the tenure of each TMT member, we calculated the proportion 
of TMT members that were founders of the VC firm. Because organizational founders carry 
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the institutional spirit of the organization’s initial strive for legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965), 
they create a lasting imprint on the organization’s decision processes (Boeker, 1989). 
Therefore, the extent to which founders are still present on the TMT captures the relative 
rigidity of decision-making processes within the TMT
6
. 
Last among our control variables on particular characteristics of the TMT was the 
proportion of team members with prior entrepreneurial experience. Ventures at the earliest 
stages of development are often newly founded and led by ambitious entrepreneurs. To the 
extent that team members have had such experience in the past, they likely have a better 
understanding of the complexities of start-up and emerging environments, and may be more 
inclined to invest in these early stage portfolio companies. In measuring prior entrepreneurial 
experience, we coded each TMT member for whether he or she had previously founded a 
company and calculated the proportion of team members that have done so.     
Finally, we accounted for the differences in investment opportunities available to the 
VC firms. On one hand, such differences stem from the VC firm’s prior investment activity 
and developed expertise – early-stage deals may not be equally accessible by all VC firms. In 
order to control for deal flow availability, we included two variables: the number of first-time 
deals executed prior to 1997 and the proportion of these deals that were early-stage. On the 
other hand, VC firms focusing on different industries may also have different exposure to 
early-stage deals. Therefore, in order to account for between-industry differences in sources 
and number of opportunities (Klevorick, Levin, Nelson, and Winter, 1995), we controlled for 
the industry of the investments. In particular, we acknowledge that the majority of early stage 
investments tend to be in high-technology industries. Therefore, we used two such industry 
groups based on the industry classifications of VentureXpert database – ICT (including 
                                                 
6
 We also note that the proportion of founder decreases as the number of TMT members increases. To the extent 
that the number of TMT members increases as a result of the VC firm’s growing size, there are more slack 
resources and tenure variety, which in turn imply higher decision making discretion.  
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communications, computer related, semiconductors and electronics) and Medical/Biotech 
(including medical and pharmaceutical, and biotechnology) – and created variables 
representing the proportion of investments made in each of these industry categories.  
5. Results 
Table 1 presents the correlations and descriptive statistics for the variables. To test the 
hypotheses, we used OLS regression analysis. Our diagnostic tests indicated that the data did 
not violate the assumptions of linearity, normality, homoskedasticity, and independence 
necessary for an unbiased and efficient OLS estimation
7
.  In addition, we identified 4 
multivariate outliers in the dataset using the method developed by Hadi (1992) and a strict 
significance level (p < .001). Our examination revealed that these outliers pertained to some 
of the largest buyout firms. Given the distinction made between buyout and venture capital 
investing (e.g., Wright and Robbie, 1998), we excluded these outliers from further analysis.  
The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 2.  In the first estimation, 
we entered the control variables for industry, investment activity prior to 1997, TMT 
characteristics, and structural holes. This base model explained a statistically significant share 
of the variance in the proportion of early-stage investments in the VC firms’ portfolios (R2= 
.52, p < .001).  Next, we added the main effects for finance capacity, reputation, and status. 
The variables improved the model fit over the base model (R2= .04, p < .05). Hypothesis 1 
proposed a negative relationship between finance capacity and early-stage investing.  The 
effect of finance capacity was negative and significant (β = -.30, p < .01) – higher finance 
capacity was associated with fewer investments in early-stage companies (and hence more 
investments in late-stage companies)
8
. This provides support for hypothesis 1. The main 
                                                 
7
 Residual plots indicated a linear relationship between independent variables and dependent variables.  In 
addition, an information matrix test (Cameron and Trivedi, 1990) revealed no evidence for heteroskedasticity (p 
> .45) or non-normal skewness (p > .24).  
  
8
 The other side of this relationship suggests that low finance capacity is associated with more early-stage 
investing. As we indicated earlier, in addition to the entrepreneurial experience included in the model, 
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effects for reputation and status were not significant (β = -.13, p > .10 and β = -.06, p > .10, 
respectively).  
------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here  
------------------------------------------------------ 
Finally, we estimated the full model by adding the interaction terms for finance 
capacity and reputation and for finance capacity and status. In order to reduce the collinearity 
of the interaction terms, we computed them by using the mean-centered values of finance 
capacity, reputation, and status. We ensured that multicollinearity did not affect the results by 
calculating variance inflation factors – the highest value was 8.35, which was well within the 
accepted limits (cf. Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black, 1998).   
As the full model shows, the interactions explained a significant amount of the 
variance over and above the main-effects model (R2= .05, p < .01) and further reinforced 
the negative effect of finance capacity (β = -.33, p < .01). Specifically, the interactions of 
finance capacity with both reputation (β = .33, p < .05) and status (β  = -.48, p < .001) were 
significant. In order to examine the nature of these interactions, we followed the 
recommendation of Cohen and Cohen (1983) and plotted the effects of finance capacity on 
early-stage investments for reputation and status values of one standard deviation above and 
below their means.  The interaction plots are shown in Figures 2 and 3. As Figure 2 shows, 
with increasing levels of finance capacity there is a decrease in the proportion of early-stage 
investments but this decrease is greater for low-reputation firms than for high-reputation 
firms. This suggests that as a VC firm’s finance capacity increases, it is more likely to avoid 
                                                                                                                                                        
experience that gives the VC partners extensive marketing or operations knowledge of particular industries may 
make them more inclined to invest in these industries at earlier stages. We therefore examined the nature and 
effect of the proportion of VC partners with experience in industries other than finance, consulting or law. 
Including this variable in the model did not change the pattern or significance of the results presented here. In 
addition, this variable was an almost direct opposite of finance capacity – VC partners tend to have experience 
in either finance industries or in such non-finance industries, with few incidences of experience in both areas. 
This suggests that low finance capacity implies more experience in these alternative industries, thereby 
explaining the higher degree of early-stage investing. 
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early-stage investments (i.e. allocate its funds to late-stage investments) if it has a low 
reputation. This alleviating effect of reputation is opposite to that offered in hypothesis 2.  
As illustrated in Figure 3, with increasing levels of finance capacity there is a 
decrease in the proportion of early-stage investments and this decrease is greater for high-
status firms than for low-status firms. This suggests that for VC firms with high finance 
capacity, those with high status are even more likely to avoid early-stage investments. This 
enhancing effect of status provides support for hypothesis 3. 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here  
------------------------------------------------------ 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The results of this paper suggest that investment choices are strongly influenced by 
the type of expertise possessed by the VC firm’s management team.  In addition, this 
expertise-choice relationship is moderated by the VC firm’s social standing – its dynamics 
change as the firm’s reputation or status increase. While the current research view of venture 
capitalists is predominantly as homogeneous decision makers, the theoretical insights of this 
paper add important team- and firm-specific elements to our understanding of the VC 
decision making process. These in turn allow us to more rigorously and systematically 
understand why equally aspiring VC firms make different investment choices.  Such 
differences arise, in part, from differences in how management teams interpret and react to 
the market information brought by prospective ventures. Interpretation and reaction are thus 
endogenous to the decision making process – they are largely dependent on decision makers’ 
expertise and the social standing of their firm.  We thus demonstrate how the inclusion of 
psychological and sociological constructs can enrich the study of venture capital decision 
making, long studied only through the lenses of finance.  
More broadly, this work builds on and extends research suggesting that a team’s 
variety must be “requisite” to the complexities and challenges posed by the sub-environments 
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that the organization faces (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2003). In addition, it adds fuel to arguments 
that researchers need to move beyond the assumption that the environment is an 
undifferentiated whole (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2003). For example, this sample of VC firms 
faced the “same” environment, but there was variance among these firms in terms of the sub-
environments (investment stages) in which they chose to invest. Finance capacity explained a 
significant portion of this variance.  It better equips VC firms to examine and select late-stage 
deals and thus, to the extent that it is not offset by other experiences, steers them away from 
early-stage deals. However, our findings also suggest that a main-effects-only relationship is 
too simplistic; it is also dependent on the VC firm’s status and reputation.  We thus contribute 
to the upper echelon perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) by highlighting the 
moderating role of an organization’s external image and social position in top management 
team decision processes.  
As expected, organizational status magnified the negative relationship between the 
management team’s finance capacity and investing in early-stage ventures. We followed 
Podolny (2001) by investigating the VC industry, but while he focused on the effects of 
within-firm changes in status, we focused on between-firm differences in status. Our 
contributing finding is that while some high-status VC firms avoid early-stage ventures 
(consistent with Podolny [2001]), others prefer them. The distinguishing factor between the 
two is the management team’s finance capacity. As status offers privileges that are not based 
on merit (Washington and Zajac, 2005), our results suggest that these privileges are not easily 
extended in all contexts – firms would not exert such privileges in situations where their 
expertise clashes with the particular merit basis. To the extent that being involved in areas 
where one lacks expertise could lead to negative outcomes, such an action may also be seen 
as a way of avoiding negative association that could ultimately undermine one’s status.    
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Contrary to what we expected, we found that reputation moderated the relationship 
between the finance capacity of the VC firm’s management team and early-stage investing. 
Less reputable firms with high finance capacity made fewer early-stage investments than 
their more reputable counterparts. A possible explanation for this initially surprising finding 
might involve the notion of slack resources, generally defined as the pool of resources in 
excess of the minimum needed to produce a given level of organizational output (Nohria and 
Gulati, 1996).  As reputation reflects good prior performance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), 
firms with higher reputation may have higher accumulations of slack resources. These 
resources may in turn enable them to engage in experimentation (Cyert and March, 1963) and 
in implementation of new strategies (Hambrick and Snow, 1977).  Thus, where slack 
resources are available top managers have greater discretion to act (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1990; Levinthal and March, 1981). In the context of VC firms, the slack resources 
generated by its reputation may encourage VC firms to make “experimental” investments, 
i.e., those that fall outside the scope of their current investment strategy as characterized by 
their requisite expertise.  The above argument is consistent with findings that reputation 
lowers the entry barriers into innovative domains (Carow, 1999).  
Alternatively, the positive moderating effect of reputation may be explained by the 
VCs’ beliefs that they can influence the success of the portfolio company. Although a VC 
firm may not have the requisite expertise for early-stage investments, its high reputation may 
enable it to attract the necessary expertise externally. In addition, reputable VC firms may 
attract better-quality ventures (Shane and Cable, 2002), which serves as additional alleviation 
of the lack of requisite expertise.  
The differential effects for status and reputation also raise some interesting 
possibilities about the ways in which these two constructs are related to one another. 
Although they each represent an aspect of perceived quality, our results suggest that they are 
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tapping into different facets of this underlying construct. The position in a social network 
(status) seems to put a damper on behavior perhaps because it represents TMT’s 
consideration for consistency between behavior and social position – “we need to protect our 
position!”  On the other hand, reputation appears to do the opposite and may reflect a TMT’s 
proactive adaptation, as represented by the notion of experimentation (Cyert and March, 
1963). By including both status and reputation as separate measures, we were able to evaluate 
the influence of social position and capture reputation effects.    
With this study, we open the door to examining the interaction between intra-and 
inter-organizational cognition (reputation and status ordering). This creates several 
possibilities for future research into the relationship between an organization’s reputation and 
status and its perception of various dimensions of the environment. While researchers have 
shown that some aspects of the environment are commonly perceived within industries, 
others, like hostility and controllability are not (Sutcliffe and Huber, 1998). The findings of 
this paper suggest that there may be reputation and/or status-based clustering in within-
industry perceptions that can be uncovered by future research. This may be particularly 
relevant to the VC industry where top VC firms are often associated with the emergence of 
new technologies. Further, while TMT composition is currently used as an exogenous 
predictor of organizations’ perceptions and actions (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), our 
findings suggest that there may be reputation and/or status-related considerations affecting 
the composition of top management teams.        
As with all studies there are a number of limitations to our study.  First, although 
theory and previous longitudinal research have suggested the causal direction hypothesized 
here, the cross-sectional nature of our study does not allow us to rule out the possibility of 
reverse causality.  Second, we have not considered the possible effects of a potential 
venture’s reputation. For ventures started by renowned scientists or entrepreneurs there may 
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be different dynamics to the investment selection process than those alluded to in the paper. 
Third, by taking a single snapshot of the management team, we were not able to consider the 
effects of changes in the management team composition prior to our study and within the 
specified investment period. Although the VC industry is not a high-turnover one (especially 
at the general partner level), there nevertheless remains a possibility that some of the team 
members were not involved in all the investments over the study period. Finally, we selected 
a sample that reduced possible confounding factors but in doing so limited the 
generalizability of our results. For those that do wish to relate the findings to the broader 
population of VC firms, we point out that the firms in our sample tend to be older and larger 
than those in the broader population, e.g., this sample includes half of the top 100 and 40 
percent of the top 200 VC firms.  
There are also a number of practical implications that emerge from our study. From 
the VC firm perspective, the results provide insight into how their management team 
expertise and social standing affect their deal flow and ultimate investment selection. From 
the perspective of the recipient of venture capital, our results suggest that entrepreneurs 
looking for early-stage financing for their ventures would be well served by an in-depth 
examination of the management expertise of their potential VC firms. Given the strong 
network repercussion of a “no decision” it pays to be exposed to the “right” VC firm early on.    
In conclusion, there is a long-standing debate in the organizational and management 
literatures on the internal versus external determinism of organizational outcomes. Although 
there is implicit acceptance of the idea that the two are somehow intertwined in the complex 
picture of organizational reality, researchers predominantly focus on one to the exclusion of 
the other. We have shown that by combining both sets of considerations our explanatory 
power greatly increases. More generally, the integration of complementary perspectives is a 
fruitful avenue for advancing organizational research. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
a
 
 
  Mean S.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Early-stage investments .43 .19              
 2. ICT Industries .77 .21 .43             
 3. Medical/Biotech Industries .09 .10 .01 -.41            
 4. Number of first-time deals, pre-1997 74.47 92.99 .11 -.09 .22           
 5. Proportion of early-stage investments pre-1997 .40 .27 .53 .12 .18 .33          
 6. Functional diversity .59 .16 .27 .15 -.08 .12 .23         
 7. Industry diversity .55 .18 .30 .27 -.09 .00 .11 .56        
 8. Team size 6.65 3.03 .11 .08 -.01 .53 .18 .30 .28       
 9. Founder tenure .18 .22 -.09 -.09 -.04 -.16 -.15 -.06 -.25 -.32      
 10. Entrepreneurial experience .19 .20 .38 .21 .01 -.06 .15 .20 .48 .04 -.05     
 11. Structural holes .03 .02 -.11 -.37 -.15 -.35 -.21 -.05 -.15 -.24 .10 -.08    
 12. Finance capacity .56 .32 -.52 -.25 -.20 -.30 -.40 -.44 -.23 -.19 .25 -.41 -.25   
 13. Reputation -.04 .67 .15 .01 .16 .88 .38 .10 .05 .59 -.24 .00 .35 -.34  
 14. Status .12 .11 .22 .26 .10 .71 .33 .14 .15 .49 -.10 .10 .45 -.30 .80 
a
 n = 104. All correlations with absolute values above 0.19 are significant at p < .05. 
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TABLE 2 
Results of Regression Analysis for Proportion of Early-Stage Investments
a
 
 
 Base model Main effects   Full Model 
Constant -.262* -.078 -.133 
ICT industries .474*** .423*** .534*** 
Medical/Biotech industries .146+ .077 .134 
Number of first-time deals prior to 1997 .084 .163 .225 
Proportion of early stage investments prior to 1997 .426*** .411*** .351*** 
Functional diversity .052 -.115 -.104 
Industry diversity .059 .168 .193+ 
Team size -.021 .039 -.029 
Founder tenure .033 .107 .111 
Entrepreneurial experience .207* .092 .022 
Structural holes .227* .230* .210* 
Finance capacity  -.301** -.326** 
Reputation  -.134 -.211 
Status  -.059 -.065 
Finance capacity x Reputation   .326* 
Finance capacity x Status   -.483*** 
    
Model    
R
2
 .517 .560 .614 
Adjusted R
2
 .465 .496 .547 
F-statistic 9.86*** 8.72*** 9.22*** 
ΔR2  .043 .054 
ΔF  2.88* 6.04** 
n 103 103 103 
 
a 
Standardized coefficients shown in table. 
 
+ p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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FIGURE 1 
Proportion of First-Time Investments in Early-Stage Companies by US VC Firms 
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FIGURE 2 
The Moderating Effect of Reputation on the Relationship between Finance Capacity 
and Early-Stage Investing 
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FIGURE 3 
 The Moderating Effect of Status on the Relationship between Finance Capacity and 
Early-Stage Investing   
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